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Abstract 
Real world experience shows that economies are either suffered from 
poverty trap, with low income and high crime rate, or develop into a mature 
economy, with high income and low crime rate. While investments in human capital 
are frequently justified as an important factor in economic growth, the severity of 
criminal activities may act adversely. In this thesis, a dynamic general equilibrium 
model of occupation decision is created. Each agent is free to choose either to be a 
skilled worker, unskilled worker or robber. Base on the framework of endogeneous 
job decision, we then study the steady-state equilibrium where the economy is first, 
a small economy and second, a large economy and the results guide our quantitative 
investigation. We also re-examine the policy results in Hanushek et. al. (2003) and 
both education subsidies and wage subsidies may dominate the other policy 
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1 Introduction 
The relationship between investment in human capital and economic growth 
have been extensively documented and can be in different forms such as, ed-
ucation, on-the job training and nutrition^. Investment in education, unlike 
the other forms, is subjected to government intervention for several reasons. 
For instance, Rauch (1993) justifies that investment in education induced 
positive externality and Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) tries to measure the 
external rate of return using the Compulsory Schooling Laws as instrumental 
variables and finds that the positive external rate of return range from 1-3%. 
Externalities of this kind can be in different forms such as involvement in 
politics and reduction in crime. Since private investors may not take social 
benefits into account, government intervention is necessary. 
While investment in education may increase future return, it is not easy 
to finance the cost of education by borrowing as the idiosyncratic risk in-
volved can be large. Boldrin (2005) shows that government intervention is 
needed to solve the problem of capital market imperfections in an overlapping 
“ iSee Thomas & Strauss (1997), Dasgupta (1997), Schultz (1997) Lee et. al. (1997)， 
Regner (2002), Booth et. al. (2002)，Clemens k Soretz (2004), Galor & Moav (2004)， 
Bond et. al. (2003), Li k Zhu (2004), Diaz-Vazquez k Snower (2004), among others.. 
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generation model. 
Redistribution motives account for the third reason for government inter-
vention^. Provided that the society has certain expectation on the distribu-
tion of income which is not attainable through the "invisible hand", govern-
ment involvement is justified as appropriate. In addition, some studies find 
that economic development is positively related to intergenerational mobil-
ity and education is the main determinant for the change in social hierarchy 
[lyigun (1999), Bluedorn and Cascio (2005)]. While government interven-
tion provides more education opportunities, whether individuals want to be 
educated or not depends on the expected income. 
Recently, researchers have identified another possible justification for edu-
cation subsidy. It has been said that education may discourage crime, which 
would in turn stimulate economic growth. On the empirical front, Wong 
(1995) finds that "growing economic prosperity and rising educated stan-
dard contributed to the overall decline in crime rate". Axarloglou (2005) 
make use of the states level data of USA to show that relative crime rate 
among different states is one of the most important determinants to affect 
the inward FDI. Rodrik (1999) provides another empirical study showing 
2See Hanushek et al. (2003, 2005) for a review of the literature. 
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the relationship between social unrest and economic growth. He pointed out 
that external shock, social unrest and the effectiveness of the government are 
interacting with each others. Under an external shock, a country with weak 
government and high level of social unrest suffered most. Attempts have also 
been made to explain the relationship between inequality and crime rate. 
On the theoretical side, for instance, Imrohoroglu et. al. (2000) tries to 
explain the positive correlation between inequality and crime rate observed 
in US data through a general equilibrium model. Mehlum et. al. (2005) 
provides a static-theoretical framework explaining how social conditions and 
economic performance are related. They show that "the economy may end 
up in a poverty trap with high crime and low production or obtain full 
modernization with low crime rate". While this model shows the relationship 
between robbers and workers, it assumes modern sector job creation is the 
only source for economic growth without any consideration on education 
choice, Burdett et. al. (2004) presents a dynamic search theoretic model 
in which poverty trap may endogenously arise in the face of a high crime 
...rate. Lochner (2004) provides a partial equilibrium model of work, crime and 
human capital investment. Assuming that criminal activities can be divided 
into unskilled crimes and "white collar crimes", this model finds that the first 
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kind of crime are mostly committed by uneducated people while that of the 
white collar crimes is committed by skilled or educated labor. At the same 
time, the model predicts that both kinds of crime decrease with the level of 
human capital (as the higher the human capital level, the higher the income 
and thus, the higher the cost of incarceration.) Huang et. al. (2004), in 
addition, explains the above relationship based on a continuous time model 
of search and matching without capital market (and hence without capital 
constraint). It shows that high crime, low levels of education attainment, 
unemployment and poverty is one of the feasible equilibrium for the economy. 
To complement the previous literature, this thesis tries to investigate how 
occupational decisions, criminal activities and physical capital accumulation 
are related in a dynamic general equilibrium model. To be more specific, this 
thesis introduces a criminal option for the unskilled workers as an alternative 
career choice into the overlapping generation model developed by Fender and 
Wang (2003). A merit of the framework of Fender and Wang (2003) is that, 
as in the case of many developing countries, young agents who would go to 
..enroll in college may be subject to capital constraint. Tuition loan competes 
with capital investment for funds in the market, and the latter is important 
in determining the marginal product of skilled workers, which in turn affects 
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the career choice of young agents to enroll in education or not. Clearly, 
multiple equilibria are possible, as previous theoretical works have pointed 
out. Interestingly, in all of our numerical simulations, unique equilibrium 
is obtained, whether in the context of a small open economy or a closed 
economy (with endogenous interest rate). We then further proceed to policy 
analysis. In particular, we re-examine the "ordering" of the redistribution 
policies studied by Hanushek et al. (2003). 
The structure of this thesis is summarized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the theoretical model where the economy is a small open economy. We try to 
further illustrate the steady-state equilibrium through numerical examples. 
In Section 3, we extend the benchmark model by changing the small open 
economy into a closed economy, in this case, the real interest rate would 
be an endogenous variable instead. At the same time, government policies 
would be evaluated in terms of the redistribution effects. The last Section 
concludes. 
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2 The Basic Model under Small Open Econ-
omy 
2.1 Introduction 
Since Becker (1962) and Mincer (1958), the academic literature on human 
capital quickly expands, and it is then related to a number of important 
issues, such as nutrition, technological innovation, economic growth and for-
mal schooling system. Investment in human capital can be regarded as an 
investment in the skill level of labor. A current investment in human capital, 
assuming that investment in human capital is not risky, would undoubtedly 
affect the productivity in the future (production capacity of the economy) 
and the future earnings. Psacharopoulos (2004) provides empirical evidence 
on the returns to investment in education and finds that the world average 
private rate of return for those who received secondary education is around 
19% while those who received higher education is 17%. 
With the rising interest on the dynamic growth paths of economies, 
Iwaisako (2002) introduces a two-period overlapping generation model to 
show that an economy may have endogenous cycle, a poverty trap or perma-
6 
nent growth. He concludes that "whether the underdevelopment traps are 
generated is dependent on the parameter that represents how total output 
is distributed between workers and investors. “ Moreover, the economy can 
"escape" from the poverty trap and turns to permanent growth. Moreover, 
Boldrin (2005) presents an over-lapping generation model where school at-
tendance and financing of schooling are endogenized. When different initial 
conditions are given, he shows that by studying the dynamic paths of the 
economy, the economy can suffer from poverty trap or keep on growing. 
Criminal activities can adversely affect the economy in several aspects 
including the inflow of FDI, tourism, concentration of experts, and social 
breakdown^. While criminal activities are not avoidable, it is negatively 
related to economic growth. Becker (1968) provides a theoretical analysis on 
the issue of crime and law enforcement. He concludes that although criminal 
activities are harmful, it is costly to prevent all criminal activities. So, there 
is an optimal policy determining the equilibrium level of crime rate. 
Mocan et. al. (2005), on the other hand, presents an two-stage dynamic 
theoretical model where individuals are endowed with both criminal capital 
3Please see Burnham et al. (2004), Levantis and Gani (2000)，Axarloglou (2005)， 
Conley and Wang (2004) for survey. 
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and legal human capital (such as the ability to learn). The higher the level 
of criminal (legal) capital, the higher the expected return by participating 
in the corresponding sector. Agents make the job decision at the beginning 
of each of the period. This model shows that under different situation, in-
dividuals may switch between legal and criminal sector. Interesting findings 
are concluded. For example, imprisonment as a kind of punishment is not 
necessarily good for the society as peer effects in prison may enhance the 
criminal human capital. 
In this economy, under the two period over-lapping generation model, 
agent decides to receive education or not in the first period. Education is the 
only source of investment in human capital. Bequest is assumed to be zero 
and human capital can not serve as collateral and thus, they have to borrow 
in order to finance the education cost. For those who choose not to receive 
education, they go to work in the first period and then lend their earnings 
to those who want to be educated or invest in physical capital. Whether 
individual receive education or not depends on the distribution of disutility 
•  (inverse of ability) and expected return. 
Please Insert table 1 here 
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In what follows, we extend Fender & Wang (2003) model by allowing the 
existence of robbers. We will concentrate on the implications of the change 
in equilibrium level of human capital investment and capital-skilled labor ra-
tio. In the following sub-sections, section 2.2 presents the benchmark model, 
section 2.3 presents the steady-state conditions and section 2.4 considers the 
numerical examples. 
2.2 Benchmark Model 
Our model is an extension of Fender and Wang (2003), which is a two-period 
overlapping generation (OLG) model. To facilitate the comparison, our as-
sumptions and notations would be kept as close to Fender and Wang as 
possible. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor. Agents are identical 
and the only difference lies in the disutility towards education and robbery'^. 
The model focuses on occupation decision and investment in physical capi-
tal. Agents live for two periods^ and in the first period, they make the job 
decision. Each generation is divided into three groups, educated agents, un-
4 As it is an extension of Fender & Wang (2003) model, we try to use similar notations 
to represent the same variables in order to avoid unnecessary complication. 
5 We implicitly assume that population of the economy is constant over time i.e. the 
birth rate equals to the death rate. 
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educated agents and robbers. To simplify the analysis, the population of the 
economy is normalized to unity i.e. 
+ + = l (1) 
where t is the time index and Xe, Xu and Xr are the proportion of educated 
agents, uneducated agents and robbers respectively. 
There are two kinds of disutility a and C representing the disutility for 
those who receive education and those who choose to be robbers and both of 
them are uniformly distributed on the interval [-£, £]• A product of these two 
uniform distributions formulate a joint-distribution determining the equilib-
rium portion of education agents and robbers. Each people denoted one 
period to go to work inelastically (either in the first period or second period 
depending on the job decision) and then receive income®. The utility func-
tion is assumed to be linear and only the disutility incurred together with 
the amount of consumption, C, affect the utility level. 
GAlthough robbers do not participate in any formal employment, in our model, we 
assume that the attempt to rob the others during the matching process is the working 
hour for robbers. 
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C (e) — a if X = e 
U (X; a , C ) = < C(u) iix = u • ( 2 ) 
C (r) - C if X = r 
\ 
where x = e, u, r, a represents the disutility incurred to the individual 
if he/she enrolls in college, and ( represents the disutility incurred to the 
individual if he/she chooses to be a robber. Thus,. 
If agent chooses to be skilled labor, he has to pay for the school fees, Q, 
in the first period. In this model, the young generation were born without 
bequest and hence they need to borrow in order to finance the school fees. 
After that, he receives education in the first period, incurs disutility and 
then go to work in the second period, receive their wage and then repay the 
education loan. For those who choose not to receive education, they become 
unskilled workers or robbers. Unskilled labors go to work when they are 
young and then invest their wage either in the physical capital or become 
lenders. In the second period, they receive principal and interest return. 
For robbers, they wait until the second period. In the second period, after 
skilled and unskilled workers receive their income, they go to market to look 
for goods for consumption/ The interaction between all agents are governed 
7 In practice, there are some high-tech robbery through stealing and using passwords of 
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by a random matching process. If either a skilled or unskilled worker meet a 
robber, robbery exists and certain proportion of the victims' income become 
the income of robbers. If a robber meet another robber, no robbery exist and 
their income (consumption) would be zero. Once the total income for each 
of the agents is finalized, they spend all of their income for consumption®. 
Please Insert Figure 1 here. 
With the probability of meeting a robber, individuals make their decisions 
base on the expected income and disutility. The expected disposable income, 
which equals to expected consumption level, to skilled {unskilled) labors and 
robbers are denoted as EWe t^ {EWu,t) and EWr,t and 77 (p) are the proportion 
of income will be robbed when skilled {unskilled) labor meet a robber in the 
second period. We have®: 
EWe,t = - r]Xr,t-i) — (1 — rt.i)e 
EWu,t = iy(l + rt-i)(l-pXr,t-i) 
others and then re-allocate money to their own accounts. Due to the lack of data, and the 
possible complexity by introducing high-tech robbers in the model, we can only abstract 
them away from the model. 
8For the sequence of actions of different kinds of agent, please refer to figure 1. 
9 For details of the derivation, please refer to appendix A. 
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and 
EWr,t = r]We,tXe,t-i + (1 + U-i) piyXu,t-i 
Clearly, investment in human capital is attractive only if the utility level, 
evaluated in the second period, is higher than that of uneducated people and 
robbers. As we have a continuous distribution of disutility, in equilibrium, 
the marginal agent i should be indifferent between choosing to be skilled or 
unskilled labor. Hence, 
EUe{a\C) = EUu (3) 
where a* and represent the critical values for disutility of education 
and robberyio. Similarly, among the uneducated population, they can choose 
to be unskilled worker or robbers. As in the skilled-unskilled decision, the 
marginal agent is indifferent between choosing to be skilled or unskilled labor. 
Hence, we have: 
i()To solve for the shole system, we have to determine the critical value for disutilities. 
.‘.Appendix C provides us the details about the relationship between the critical value for 
disutilities and equilibrium level of skilled labor and robber. For details, please refer to 
appendix C. 
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EUr{a\C) = EU^. (4) 
The equilibrium occupation decision for each generation can be summa-
rized in a two-stage diagram^. 
Please Insert Figure 2 here. 
Each individuals makes the job decision by first, comparing the expected 
utility between being robbers or unskilled labor and then secondly, comparing 
the expected utility between skilled labor and the resulting expected utility 
can be incurred in the previous sub-game. Thus, by backward induction, 
each individuals make their own occupational choice. Moreover, we adopt 
an assumption from Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), namely, the disutility of 
incurred as being a robber is a private information. Without this assumption, 
i.e. the disutility incurred as being robber is public information, each agents 
in the economy would know who is going to be robbers and thus, the random 
,.matching process may dissipate. 
Now, we explain the production side of the model. There is only one good 
For details, please refer to figure 2. 
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in this economy, and it can be produced by unskilled labor or skilled labor 
together with physical capital. Thus, we have 
Yt = Yu,t + V；,^  (5) 
where Yt is the total output of period t and Yu,t and Ye^t are the amount 
of production produced by unskilled labor and skilled labor with physical 
capital respectively. The marginal production of unskilled labor is assumed 
to be a constant, v. For skilled labor, the production process requires both 
skilled labor and physical capital and it is assumed to follow a constant 
returns Cobb-Douglas production function: 
= X ^ — i K ” = Xe ’ t- ik” (6) 
where kt is the capital-skilled labor ratio which is equal to ^^^ ^. 
With competitive factor markets, the returns of different production fac-
tors equal to their marginal products and thus: 
rt = { l - - 5 
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where 5 denotes the depreciation rate of physical capital. 
Denoted the expected utility (at time t) of skilled labors, unskilled labors 
and robbers as EUe, EUu and EUr respectively, we have^^: 
EUe = We,t [1 - — (1 + O - l ) 没 ( 7 ) 
EUu 二（1 + rt-i)Wu,t-i [1 - pXr,t-i] (8) 
EUr = VWe,tXe,t-l + pWu,tXu,t-l — C ( 9 ) 
where EUe {EUr) is the expected utility of skilled labor (robber). Moreover, 
while Xe, Xu and Xr represent the proportion of educated agents, unedu-
cated agents and robbers in the economy respectively, Xe {Xu) represents 
the probability for a robber to meet a skilled {unskilled) labor and Xr rep-
resents the probability for skilled (unskilled) labor to meet a robber in the 
random matching process^ .^ Since the returns of different production fac-
tors equals to their marginal products, the proportion of skilled labor in the 
12To see how the equations are derived, please refer to appendix A. 
i^To derive the probability for a skilled or unskilled labor to meet a robber, we first 
assume the matching function, m, equals to (^^xj+xr'+xl). And the matching function 
indicates the probability for a meanful matching (in this case, a robber meet a worker). 
Hence, the probability for a robber meeting a skilled labor equals to (乂 乂<=入).After the 
substitution of m into the probability, it becomes Xe.By similar method, the probability 
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economy cannot be zero, otherwise, the value of capital-skilled labor ratio 
would tend to infinity. On the other hand, the propotion of robber in the 
economy cannot be one, otherwise, the expected income for robber would 
be zero. Similarly, the proportion of robber of the economy does not likely 
to reach zero. If the number of robber rise from zero to one, that robber 
must meet either a skilled or unskilled labor and the expected income and 
the level of disutility incurred would be extremely large. Thus, eliminating 
the possibility of corner solution. 
To complete the description of the model, we now turn to the capital-
accumulation process. Basically, it can summarized by the goods market 
clearing condition, which is a difference equation: 
where AC^^t (X = e, u, r) represents the aggregate consumption of group 
X at time t and we have: • 
for robber meeting unskilled labor equals to 老(Xe+x^) = On the other hand, the 
probability for a labor to meet a robber equals to xj+x^ and by substituting function m 
into the probability, it can be pinned down into Xr. 
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( 
= EWu,t{^ + rt-i)Xu,t-i = EWu,t{l + n-i)( l — — if X = ^^  
{r]We,tXe,t-l + pWu,tXu,t-l)Xr if X = 厂 
The left hand side of (10) represents the net change in physical capital 
while the right hand side equals to the total product minus consumption and 
resources used to educate those who want to be at time t. And it can be 
rewritten as a function of k, Xe and Xy. 
2.3 Discussion of Results 
In this section, we focus on the case of small economy, where the real interest 
rate is determined by the rest of the world and hence is regarded as given 
by the model economy. (We will get back to the closed economy case, as 
in Fender h Wang (2003) in later sections). Moverover, we assume that 
all variables take on their steady-state values in the following analysis and 
so, we drop all the time subscripts. With a constant real interest rate, the 
equilibrium allocation is much simpler. First, the capital-skilled labor ratio 
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can be determined immediately^^, 
\r + 6J 
and since the wage return for skilled labor, We, is a function of k, it become 
an "exogenous" variable too. The variables remains to be solved are the 
composition of the population. As we have normalized the population into 
one, once we find out the steady-state value of any two groups we can find 
out the one left by equation (1). Our main task remain is how to determine 
the value of X^, Xu and the critical value for disutilities, a* and C-
2.3.1 Agent Behaviour 
To see how to determine the critical values for disutilities, we try to provide 
a detailed discussion on agent behaviour. As mentioned before, occupational 
decisions are made base on the corresponding expected utility generated. 
Each agent compares the expected utility incurred if they participate in dif-
ferent occupations and then choose the one with the highest expected utility. 
Thus, we have: 
14 Recall that the capital-skilled labor ratio equals to 是.Thus, the steady state capital 
stock, K = kXe and the physical accumulation process reduces into a function X^. 
15For the derivation of k, please refer to appendix B. 
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EU {a, 0 = max {EUe{a, C), EUu ( a , C), EUr{a , ( ) } (11) 
Recall that both kinds of disutilities are uniformly distributed, thus, the 
whole population can be represented by a cube. Figure 3a and 3b show the 
bird's eye view of the cube and are divided into three areas showing differ-
ent groups of agents under different situations and the boundaries dividing 
themi6. Base on the results generated, a nonlinear relationship between the 
proportion of skilled labor (robber) in the economy and the critical disutil-
ities for education (a*) and robbery (C*) can be found. By assuming that 
a* - (* > 0, we have: 
Xe = j J +e)-a (12) 
and 
= -^dadC + a = { C ^ s ) (13) 
where a = (( 二）. Equation (12) and (13) provide us with important 
relationship between the proportion of skilled labor (robber) in the economy 
and the critical value of disutilities for education (a*) and robbery ((*). Prom 
16To see how to derive the bopundaries, please refer to appendix C. 
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equation (12) and by taking partial derivatives, we have: 
Similarly, from equation (13), we have: 
^ = - J i i . < 0 dXr C+e《u 
^ - 1 > 0 
dXr 一 4e2(e_a»)+(C*+£) 
Base on the results generated, we turn our attention to comparative sta-
tics. Recall equation (3) and (4), these equations represent the situation 
where expected utility for being 1) skilled and unskilled labor and 2) robber 
and unskilled labor for the marginal agent are the same respectively. By solv-
ing these two equations together with (12) and (13) above, the steady-state 
value for Xe and Xu can be determined and thus, all other endogenous vari-
ables can be solved correspondingly. To see how may change in parameters 
affects the endogenous variables, we have to investigate how the change in 
parameters affects the four equations. Take a change in education cost, 6 , as 
an example. A change in education cost affects only equation (3)，together 
with the relationship between the proportion of skilled labor (robber) in the 
economy and the critical value of disutilities generated above, we have: 
dXe (1 + r) 
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Thus, when there is a rise in education cost, we are sure the equilibrium 
proportion of skilled labor decrease and at the same time, the changes in 
unskilled labor and robber are unknown. Marginal agents in the education 
decision making process are forced to abandon their original decision to invest 
in human capital because of a rise in education cost. Spared labor should then 
choose either to be unskilled labor or robber. Following the above analysis, 
occupational decisions are made base on the expected utility. Among the 
spared labor, those endowed with high level of disutility towards robbery 
become robbers while those who really hate to be robbers become unskilled 
labor. For those who are not significatly affected by disutilities for education 
and robbery, they occupational decisions may be largely affected by changes 
in expected income for different groups. 
Note that investment in human capital are compensated with certain 
level of disutility, thus, the whole system may still work even if the expected 
income for skilled labor is smaller than that of unskilled labor. If the expected 
income for skilled labor is higher than that of unskilled labor, a decrease in 
skilled labor decrease the expected income for robbers no matter the spared 
labor choose to be unskilled labor or robber. Thus, as a result of rise in 
education cost, the equilibrium proportion for robber may rise or fall while 
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that of unskilled labor increase. Similarly, If the expected income for skilled 
labor is smaller than that of unskilled labor, a decrease in skilled labor rise 
the expected income for robbers no matter the spared labor choose to be 
unskilled labor or robber. Thus, as a result of rise in education cost, the 
equilibrium proportion for robber increase while that of unskilled labor is 
uncertain. 
Please Insert Figure 3 here 
2.4 Numerical Examples 
While the above subsection shows the situation under which an equilibrium 
may exist or not, one may wonder what may happen if any of the value 
assigned in the model changed. In this section, numerical examples are pre-
sented to investigate the change in equilibrium value as a results of a change 
in education cost {9), proportion of income can be robbed from skilled labor 
{p), and unskilled labor (ry). 
As in any numerical studies, the parameter values are crucially important. 
In this paper, to impose more disciplines in our numerical works, we adopt 
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the parameter values from the literature, which is summarized in Table 2. 
The first variable that we want to discuss is the share of physical capital 
in the Cobb-Douglus production function, (1 — (3). Miller and Upadhyay 
(2002) attempts to examine the Cobb-Douglus production function base on 
the panel data of 83 countries for 30 years representing different regions of the 
world. According to their estimation, the capital share range from 0.31-0.61 
depending on the income level of the targeted country we are considering. 
Lee (2000), on the other hand, tries to estimate the coefficients base on 
different model specifications with South Koreas' data from 1966 to 1997. 
The resulting estimation are similar to Miller and Upadhyay (2002), ranging 
from 0.251-0.497. Takeuchi (2005), in addition to existing literature, estimate 
the capital share bases on data in Japan. The estimates range from 0.3 to 
0.4. 
Please Insert Table 2 Here 
Unlike the estimation of physical capital share, the estimates for p and 
7] are problematic. With serious data limitations and the lack of existing 
literature, we are not sure how much a robber can be robbed from victims 
in a robbery. The best estimate we are aware of it is from Imrohoroglu et. 
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al. (2000). They make use of the average cost of property crime to victim as 
a proxy to the criminal earnings from property crime. Base on the data of 
USA, they find that the average cost for property crime reaches 16% in 1979 
and 15% in 1989 of the average after-tax annual earning of worker. They also 
mentioned that estimation in Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) yields similar 
value equals to 0.2. 
2.4.1 Base Results 
Numerical examples in this sub-section mainly investigate the effects of changes 
in 6, p and r] to the ratio of skilled and unskilled labor, ^ and the ratio of 
unskilled labor and r o b b e r ,舍 . i s assumed to be 0.4 and the real interest 
rate is assumed to be 5%. e is assumed to be equal to 4 and v equals to 5, 
so that the wage ratio for skilled and unskilled labor, which is know as the 
college-premium, would be within the range of previous estimates (for details 
about college-premium, please refer to Table 3). 
Please Insert Table 3 Here 
Table 4a and 4b show the numerical results from a change in 6 with r] and 
9 with p respectively where (3 is assumed to be 0.4. For both cases, a rise in 
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education cost results in a fall in X^ and X^ and a rise in Xu- The intuition 
is straightforward. A rise in education cost increase the amount that skilled 
labors have to borrow in order to finance the education cost and thus, the 
net expected income (expected income minus the education cost together 
with the interest payment) decrease. The numerical examples presented here 
show the situations in which less labor would like to be robbers and more 
what to be unskilled labor instead. On the other hand, a rise in p always 
results in a rise in Xr and a fall in X^ and X^as a rise in p lowered the 
relative expected income for unskilled and skilled labor and at the same time 
(due the the rising probability of meeting a robber), the expected income for 
robber increase. 
The effects for a change in 77 to the equilibrium proportion for different 
groups are similar to that of change in p but a little bit complicated. While 
the value of Xe keep decreasing and the value of Xr increase when p rise, the 
value of Xu first fall and then rise. Note that when there is a rise in rj, more 
people would like to be robbers instead. For those who originally chosed to 
be skilled labor may now become either robber or unskilled labor. However, 
when there is a rise in Xr (due to a rise in rf), not only the expected income 
for skilled labor would be affected but also the expected income for unskilled 
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labor. Thus, the equilibrium proportion for unskilled labor may decrease 
or increase depending on the change in number of robbers in the economy 
after the rise in 77. If a large proportion of spare labors choose to be robber, 
with a higher probability of meeting a robber, certain proportion of unskilled 
labor may turn to be robber instead. With the two counteracting effects, the 
equilibrium proportion of unskilled labor may fall or rise. In this case, when 
the value of rj increase continuously, we can see under what condition one of 
the effect may dominate the other. 
Please Insert Table 4 Here 
Different from the original Fender and Wang (2003) model, it is now 
possible to have Xg > as the economy is a small economy and people can 
now borrow from the rest of the world if an agent want to receive education 
without affecting the real interest rate. However, the resulting numerical 
examples generated may be far away from the real world experience. For 
example, the ratio of 舍 is around 0.2 - 0.4 in different countries but in 
our model, it is possible to exceed unity. To cope with the problem, we will 
endogenize the real interest rate in the next section. 
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3 The Basic Model under Closed Economy 
Thus far, we have assumed that the real interest rate is given to the economy 
and determined by the rest of the world. At the same time, total factor 
productivity (TFP), denoted as A, is absent from the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function. However, this may not be a good assumption for reality. 
In light of this, we relax the assumption of constant real interest rate and 
introduce TFP into the production function which affect only the physical 
capital and skilled labor. Moreover, based on the model formulated in this 
section, we attempt to evaluate the performance of government policies in 
reducing inequality. Two redistribution schemes are considered and they are 
education subsidy and wage subsidy. In the following sub-sections, section 
3.2 presents the numerical examples, section 3.3 presents the details of the 
role of government and section 3.4 considers the results. 
Recall equation (5) and (6)，introduction of TFP affects only Vg and it 
becomes: 
1； = AX仏"=AXek'-^ 
and since production factors are paid according to marginal product, we have: 
r = A(l-P)k-^ -6 
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We = Al3k" 
In this section, real interest rate is no longer an exogenous variable and 
thus, the capital-skilled labor ratio is not a constant anymore. A rise in 
Xe necessarily rise the real interest rate as the demand for education loan 
increase and thus the capital accumulation process would be affected. In this 
case, k, Xe and Xr are the endogenous variables that we want to solve for. 
Formally, by rewriting equation (3), (5) and (10)，we have: 
r]Apk^-^Xe+(l+A(l-p)k-^-6)X^iyp-C = (l+A{l-p)k-^-5)iyil-pXr) 
and 
Xek — (1 - 6)Xek = 1/(1 - Xe) + Xek" — ACr ACe AC^ Xe没， 
where the first two equations represent the occupation decision for the mar-
ginal agent and the last one is the capital-accumulation process^ Again, 
these are highly nonlinear equations and we can only approach the problem 
numerically. 
「To solve for the shole system, we have to know how to determine the critical value for 
disutilities. Thus, the complete the whole system we have to consider (12) and (13) too. 
For details, please refer to appendix C. 
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3.1 Numerical Examples 
In section 2.4, we try to provide empirical evidence for the parameter values 
used in the numerical examples for /3, p and rj. In this case, as a result of 
relaxation of assumptions, more parameter values have to assume into the 
model for numerical examples. However, due to the lack of precise estimation 
on the value of TFP, we set at an arbitrary level of TFP and see how a 
permanent improvement of TFP may affects other variables. 
3.1.1 Base Results 
Table 5a, 5b and 5c summarize the details of the numerical results. From 
table 5a, it shows how the steady-states change accordingly with the value 
of TFP. A rise in TFP resulted in a rise in 舍，会 and 欺 . I f we consider 
the value of Xe, Xu and Xr instead of the ratio, we can find that a rise 
in TFP positively affects the value of X^ and Xu but negatively affects the 
value of Xr. Comparing the changes in Xe and Xu, the magnitude of changes 
in Xe is much higher than that of Xu, resulting in a ise in 争.Note that 
a rise in TFP rise the wage ratio, and thus more people would like to 
invest in human capital. However, a rise in the demand of education loan 
rises the real interest rate i.e. the repayment of education loan increase. The 
30 
assumption of endogenous real interest rate prevents a huge increase in 争 
and at the same time, prevents unrealistic ratio of skilled to unskilled labor 
as last section. 
Please Insert Table 5 Here ” 
Table 5b and 5c summarize the effects of changes in 9, p and t). The 
pattern of changes are similar to the case with exogenous interest rate. A rise 
in education cost is associated with a fall in ^ and 会.On the other hand, 
a rise in r] and p resulted in a rise in ^ and a fall in 叙.However, different 
from the previous section, the introduction of endogenous interest rate enable 
the analysis of changes in wage ratio, When there is a rise in r] (p), 
the corresponding ratio of skilled to unskilled labor decrease {increase) and 
thus, relatively more (less) resources are now available in the investment in 
physical capital and resulted in a rise (fall) in capital-skilled labor ratio. And 
since both the wage income for skilled labor and interest rate are a function 
of k > 0 and 盖 < 0), the wage income for skilled labor increases 
{decrease) and the interest return to unskilled labor decreases (increase). 
Thus, a change in rj rises {lower) the value of the wage ratio. Besides, the 
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pattern of changes in wage ratio is different if we calculate the ratio base 
on expected income for skilled and unskilled labor instead. Taking a change 
in 77 as an example. When there is a rise in 77, the wage income for skilled 
labor increase as discussed above. However, the rise in 77 may offset the rise 
in wage income and results in a fall in expected income and expected wage 
ratio. 
After the discussion on the numerical examples, we try to compare the 
results estimated through our model with the estimates of existing empirical 
literature. Table 6 summarize the value of 舍 across countries in different 
years. In our model, skilled labor are designated as post-secondary degree 
holder or higher while unskilled labor are designated as school leaver. The 
labor ratio in different countries shows a rising trend from 1990 to 2000. For 
instance, the labor ratio of South Korea rises from about 0.16 to about 0.36, 
more than 100%, in 10 years. With the estimates in different countries, table 
6 also shows that the resulting labor ratio of our numerical examples lies with 
the boundary of some countries such as South Korea and Taiwan and similar 
to that of Bulgaria, a transitional economy. Table 1，on the other hand, 
summarize the value of college-premium and it is defined as ^ (Please refer 
to table 1 in the last section). According to the existing literature, college-
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premium is generally higher in developing countries. For example, Blom 
et. al. (2001), based on the data in Brazil in 1998, find that the college-
premium reached 2.92. Other estimates base on more developed countries 
such as Kim (2005) shows that the college-premium in Korea ranges from 
1.35 - 1.9. When the economy of South Korea continues to develop, the 
college-premium decreases from 1.9 to 1.35. The numerical results generated 
in this section are within this range, from 1.1 to 2.5，depending on the value 
of parameters. In sum, despite its simplicity, the numerical performance of 
this model is reasonable well. This provides us some confidence to the policy 
analysis, which will be conducted in the next section. 
Please Insert Table 6 Here 
3.2 Government Policy Evaluation 
We consider the government policy for at least two reasons. The laissez 
faire equilibrium may not be efficient. For instance, there is robbery in the 
model. Even if it is, government in practice may consider the equality issue 
on top on efficiency. 18 Thus, it may be instructive to examine how different 
18 Among others, see Benabou (1996a, b, 2000, 2002), Benabou and Ok (2001), Benabou 
and Tirole (2005)，Hanushek et. al. (2003) for more discussion on this. 
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redistribution policies may affect different agents' welfare. In this model, the 
government is very simple. She has to maintain a balanced budget and is 
constrained to rise revenue through a proportional income tax. She will then 
redistribute income to the agents who have legal jobs. In this section, we 
will consider two redistribution plans: 1) Education Subsidy and 2) Wage 
Subsidy. These policies have also be studied by Hanushek et. al. (2003). In 
a static general equilibrium model calibrated to match the U.S. data, they 
find that unless the externality of education is very large, the wage subsidy 
scheme always dominates the education subsidy scheme, in the sense that 
with any given level of efficiency, wage subsidy regime can always gives a 
higher level of income equality. In contrast, this paper builds a dynamic 
general equilibrium model with endogenous capital accumulation and crime 
formation, with reasonable success in matching the general experience of 
developing countries. We however, has abstracted away the possibility of un-
successful education. It is interesting to see with all these difference, whether 
such dominance will sustain. 
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3.2.1 Education Subsidy 
In this case, the government implements only education subsidies as the re-
distribution program. With education subsidies, the government taxes the 
income of skilled labor and that of unskilled labor together with interest re-
turn at the rate equals to r. Since the government is restricted to maintain 
the balanced budget, the government simply equates the total expenditure 
to tax revenue. Moreover, the education subsidy is assumed to be distrib-
uted equally among skilled labor. Thus, the budget that government facing 
satisfies the following equation: 
T[WeXe + (1 + r)WuX^] + XeQ = X^O 
where g equals to the education cost that an agent actually pays. Besides, 
g is assumed to be strictly positive which means that the education subsidy-
provided by the government does not cover the whole education cost. 
3.2.2 Wage Subsidy 
A wage subsidy is a direct subsidization of wage income for unskilled labor. 
In our model, the proportional tax, denoted as r^, levied only to skilled 
labor and the tax revenue are distributed equally among unskilled labor. 
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The government budget constraint is thus: 
r'WeXe = sXu 
where s is the wage subsidy given to each unskilled labor. 
The corresponding after tax (subsidy) expected income for skilled and 
unskilled labor becomes (1 - - rjXr) and (1 + r�pi> + s. and 
thus, (3) and (4) become: 
(1 — - TjXr) - (1 + r)0 -a* = (l + r)(" + s)(l - pXr) 
and 
(1 - O 雄 1 - � X e + (1 + r)(" + s)pXu - C* = (1 + r)(" + 5)(1 — pXr) 
3 . 2 . 3 B a s e C a s e O u t c o m e 
Similar to the previous sections, a comparison among alternative government 
policies require a substitution of numbers into the key parameters. The value 
of key parameters that we are going to use are largely based on empirical 
estimation from existing literature. 
Please Insert Table 7 Here 
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Under education subsidy, when the tax rate rise from 0% to 6%, the 
value of Xe rise from 0.1579 to 0.1958 and that of Xu decrease from 0.6321 
to 0.605. This pattern is associated with a slightly decrease in robbers (Please 
refer to Table 7). Note that the introduction of education subsidy attract 
people to invest in human capital who are originally robbers and unskilled 
labors. As a result, the marginal product (wage income) for decrease and the 
interest payment for education loan increase. However, the higher the tax 
rate under education subsidy resulted in a higher disposable income ratio in 
the economy as the higher the tax rate, the lower the education cost for each 
skilled labor has to pay and thus, the higher (lower) the disposable income 
for skilled (unskilled) labor. Besides, the higher the tax rate under education 
subsidy, the higher the total production of the economy as the productivity 
for skilled labors are higher than unskilled labor and the labor participation 
rate increase accordingly (Please refer to figure 5). 
On the other hand, the introduction of wage subsidy decrease the value 
of Xe from 0.1579 to 0.148 and rise that of unskilled labor from 0.6321 to 
0.64 when the tax rate rise from 0% to 6% (Please refer to Table 7 and 
Figure 4). The reason is straightforward. As a result of the introduction 
of wage subsidy, the expected return for skilled labor decrease while that of 
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unskilled labor increase. The fall in relative income among these two groups 
resulted in a fall in 争.Besides, the total production in the economy decrease 
slightly when the tax rate increases due to the fall in skilled labor and slightly 
increases in robbery (Please refer to figure 5). 
Comparing the numerical results presented in this section, we know that 
the introduction of education subsidy and wage subsidy generate opposite 
effects to wage ratio, equilibrium proportion for different groups and the 
total production for the economy. The introduction of education subsidy 
widen the income gap between skilled and unskilled labor but rise the total 
production of the economy, on the other hand, the introduction of wage 
subsidy narrow down the income gap but lowered the total production of 
the economy. Such phenomenon may complicate the policy making process 
if the government consider both the equality level and economy growth in 
the economy as the performance for different policy are counteracting. Thus, 
the implementation of policy may be very different depending on the welfare 
function that the social planner maximizes. 
Please Insert Figure 4 to 5 Here 
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4 Conclusions 
The thesis attempts to contribute in two ways. In terms of modelling, this 
paper extends the framework of Fender and Wang (2003) to include endoge-
nous robbery, as in Huang, Liang and Wang (2004). Interestingly, for a wide 
range of plausible parameter combinations, we always obtain an unique equi-
librium, which makes latter policy analysis much easier in some sense. And 
although the model is very stylized, our predictions in composition of labor 
force, college premium, among other statistics, are within the range of previ-
ous empirical research. Thus, the framework itself may worth more attention 
in the future research. 
In terms of policy analysis, this paper attempts to revisit the comparison 
of education subsidy and wage subsidy regimes, which has been studied by 
Hanushek et. al. (2003). Base on the quantitative results generated, the 
performance for different policies are very different. In case of education 
subsidy, it widen the income gap between skilled and unskilled labor but rise 
the total production of the economy. If case of wage subsidy, it narrow down 
the income gap but lowered the total production of the economy. 
In terms of future research, this model can be extended in many important 
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dimensions. First, the model can allow for endogenous labor-leisure choice. 
Second, the model can also extend to a multi-community setting and allow 
for local interactions, whether through the provision of local public goods, 
or through the externality of social interactions.^^ Third, perhaps more im-
portantly, the model can allow for bequest in terms of physical wealth and 
also skill (see Haunshek et. al, 2004). Some social studies have indicated 
that there are inter-generational transfer of skill (whether for legal or illegal 
work) .Some ongoing projects are being pursued along these directions. 
- Among others, see Benabou (1993’ 1994’ 1996a, b, 2000), Benabou and Tirole (2003)， 
and the reference therein. 
20Among others, see Benabou (2002)，Benabou and Ok (2001), Benabou and Tirole 
(2005), and the reference therein. 
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Appendix A 
Under the search theoretic framework, the income for skilled, unskilled 
labor and robbers are not exact and each agent make their occupational 
decisions base on expacted disposable income. To derive the expected income 
for skilled labor, we have: 
We,t(l-Xr,t-i) + {l-v)We,tXr,t-i-(l + rt-i) = M^e.t [ 1 _ r y X r ’ t - i l _ ( 1 + n - 1 ) 
where the left hand side of the equation shows that the expected disposable 
income for skilled labor equals to the sum of two fragment showing that 1) 
a skilled labor can hold the total amount of income if he does not meet a 
robber and 2) certain portion of the income, rj, will be robber if they meet a 
robber. 
By similar method, we can find out the expected disposable income for 
unskilled labor: 
" ( 1 - Xr,t-l) + ( 1 - + � — 1 = (1 + rt-i)Wu,t-l [1 - pXr,t-l] 
Finally, for robber, the expected disposable income equals to the portion 
of income robbed from skilled labor if he meets a skilled labor plus the portion 
of income robbed from unskilled labor if he meets a unskilled labor and thus 
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generating: 
Wr,t = r]We,tXe,t-l + pWu,tXu,t-l 
Besides, the expected utility for unskilled labors equals to the sum of 
expected disposable income and the expected utility for skilled labors and 
robbers equal to the expected disposable income plus the disutility terms. 
Base on the above results, we can generate equation (7)，(8) and (9). 
Appendix B 
As mentioned in section 2，the real interest rate is fixed and since return 
to physical capital depends on the marginal product, we have: 
n = (1 - - (5 
and thus, 
(1-卢 V 
\r + 6 j 
which is a constant as r is given in this case. 
Appendix C 
Agent behaviour: Unskilled Labor 
To find out the boundaries for different groups in figure 3, we first consider 
the case for unskilled labor. 
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Recall equation (7), (8) and (9), we have: 
EUe = We,t [1 — — (1 + rt-i)0 _ a 
EUu = (1 + rt-i)W^,t-i [1 - pXr,t-i] 
and .. 
EUr = r]We,tXe,t-l + pWu,tXu,t-l — C 
For those who choose to be unskilled labor, we must have: 
C) = E U u ( a , 0 , E U r ( a , 0 } 
=EUu(aX) 
EUu > EUe and EUu > EUr 
and since in equilibrium, the marginal agent follows equation (3) and (4), by 
substitution, we can generate the following two constraints: 
o c * 
and 
Q； > Q* 
Those with disutilities satisifying these two conditions would like to be an 
unskilled labor rather than other occupations and is represented by area 
EJQL in figure 3a and 3b. 
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Agent behaviour: Skilled Labor 
By similar method, those who want to be skilled labor must follow: 
C) = m e . x { E U e { a X ) , E U u i a X ) . E U r ( a , C ) } 
=EUe(a,0 
=> EUe > EUu and EUe > EUr 
On the other hand, the equilibrium conditions showing the behaviour of 
the marginal agents generate the following two conditions: 
t^* = We , t [1 - r / X r , t - i ] - (1 + r t - i ) 0 — ( 1 + r t - i ) W , , t - i [1 - p X r , t - i ] ( 1 4 ) 
and 
C* = + pW^,tXu,t-i — (1 + [1 — p X r , t - i ] ( 1 5 ) 
again, by substituting these equilibrium conditions, we can generate the fol-
lowing two constraints: 
a* > a 
and 
a * - C * 〉 a - C 
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Those who satisifies these two conditions would like to be skilled labor rather 
than robbers or unskilled labor and is represented by area BEJI in figure 3a 
and 3b. 
Agent behaviour: Robber 
For those who want to be robber, we have: 
[/(X;a，C) = m^x{EUe(a,(：), EUuia.O, EUr{a,0} 
=EUr{a,0 
EUr > EUu and EUr > EUe 
Thus, by substituting these equilibrium conditions, we can generate the 
following two constraints: 
a* < a 
and 
a* - C < ( 
Those who satisifies these two conditions would like to be robber rather than 
skilled or unskilled labor and is represented by area MKDEBMC in figure 3a 
and 3b. 
In these cases, the situations are different from that of the unskilled labor 
as we do not know the critical values for the disutilities beforehead. Thus, to 
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find out the area representing skilled labor in the diagram, we first assume 
that a* — C* > 0 and then a* — < 0 and the corresponding area is shown 
in figure 3a and 3b respectively. 
Base on the above conditions, we can find out the equilibrium proportion 
of skilled labor in the economy by integration and we have: 
if a* - C > 0 
= 去 ( 〜 ) - 宇 （16) 
= ( � ) [ i M … * ) + 华 
\ L 
‘ / 二 / 二 击 " + ¥ “ n 
if a* - C > 0 
^ r = L (17) 
if a* - C < 0 
二 去 ( 〜 ) 
\ 
thus, generating a nonlinear relationship between the proportion of skilled 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Parameter Range in Related Literature 
Parameter Parameter Value 
Proportion of income being robbed in a robbery (p and r|) 
Imrohoroglu (2000) 0.15-0.2 
1-P (The share of physical capital in Cobb-Douglas Production Function) 
Miller and Upadhyay (2002) 0.31-0.61 
Lee (2000) 0.251-0.497 
Takeuchi (2005) 0.3-0.4 
TFP 




Comparisons of College-Premium in Existing Literature with the Estimated Results: 
Parameter Value 
Blom et. Al. (2001) 2.5-2.92 
Hanushek et.al. (2003) 1.25-1.71 
Chang (2003) 1.55-1.9 
Kim (2005) 1.35-1.9 
Brainerd (1998) 1.2-1.65 
Ferreira (2004) 1.97-2.21 
Our Model h ^ 
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Table 4a 
Proportion of Skilled, Unskilled Labor and robber with 
wage ratio by rj and education cost 
！ 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 
Xe 0.638 0.6 0.55 0.486 0.433 
0.5 Xr 0.004 0.04 0.1 0.153 0.199 
Xu 0.358 0.36 0.35 0.361 0.368 
WeAVu 1.237895 1.235399 1.225263 1.208588 1.186584 
Xe 0.6 0.577 0.524 0.467 0.416 
0.75 X , 0.003 0.039 0.1 0.141 0.182 
Xu 0.397 0.384 0.376 0.392 0.402 
We/Wu 1.237895 1.235462 1.225263 1.210954 1.191133 
Xe 0.574 0.549 0.501 0.449 0.4 
1 Xr 0.002 0.034 0.08 0.129 0.169 
Xu 0.424 0.417 0.419 0.422 0.431 
WeAVu 1.237895 1.235776 1.227831 1.213307 1.19459 
Xe 0.542 0.52 0.478 0.43 0.384 
1.25 X, 0.0016 0.03 0.07 0.118 0.155 
Xu 0.4564 0.45 0.452 0.452 0.461 
We/Wu 1.237895 1.236027 1.229106 1.215454 1.198292 
Xe 0.5 0.492 0.454 0.41 0.368 
1.5 Xr 0.0008 0.026 0.066 ‘ 0.107 0.142 
„ Xu 0.4992 0.482 0.48 0.483 0.49 
WeAVu 1.237895 1.236277 1.229615 1.217592 1.201711 
In this case, /3 = 0.4，p - 0.2, r 二 0.05，v = 5 and e =4 
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Table 4b 
Proportion of Skilled, Unskilled Labor and robber with 
wage ratio by p and education cost 
P 
^ 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 
Xe 0.638 0.628 0.61 0.578 0.522 
0.5 Xr 0.004 0.0178 0.042 0.08 0.154 
Xu 0.358 0.3542 0.348 0.342 0.324 
We/Wu 1.237895 1.239001 1.24316 1.253177 1.278525 
Xe 0.6 0.596 0.576 0.54 0.473 
0.75 X, 0.003 0.0179 0.045 0.1 0.176 
Xu 0.397 0.3861 0.379 0.36 0.351 
We/Wu 1.237895 1.239008 1.243541 1.257137 1.284769 
Xe 0.574 0.564 0.542 0.5 0.423 
1 X, 0.002 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 
Xu 0.424 0.416 0.408 0.4 0.377 
We/Wu 1.237895 1.239139 1.244178 1.257137 1.291716 
Xe 0.542 0.532 0.508 0.462 0.37 
1.25 Xr 0.002 0.018 0.05 0.109 0.225 
Xu 0.456 0.45 0.442 0.429 0.405 
We/Wu 1.237895 1.239014 1.244178 1.258937 1.299109 
Xe 0.509 0.5 0.474 0.423 0.317 
1.5 Xr 0.0008 0.018 0.05 0.12 0.254 
Xu 0.4902 0.482 0.476 0.457 0.429 
We/Wu 1.237895 1.239014 1.244178 1.261154 1.307891 
In this case, = 0.5, rj 二 0.2, r 二 0.08, 二 5.5 and e =5 
52 
Table 5a 
Wage Ratio and Proportion of Skilled, Unskilled Labor and Robber 
under alternative TFP 
TFP 
4 5 6 7 8 9 
13=0.5 
Xe 0.127 0.1322 0.137 0.1419 0.146 0.15 
X . 0.27 0.25 0.231 0.212 0.193 0.1735 
Xu 0.603 0.6178 0.632 0.6461 0.661 0.6765 
We/Wu 1.093683 1.232397 1.34809 1.445808 1.529212 1.60074 
In this case, p 二 0.3, v - 0.3, v - 6, (9 = 8 and e =11 
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Table 5b 
Wage Ratio, Proportion of Skilled, Unskilled Labor and Robber 
by 7] and education cost 
Jl 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 一 
Xe 0.1453 0.1419 0.138 0.1346 0.1307 
Xr 0.1897 0.199 0.208 0.2175 0.227 
Xu 0.665 0.6591 0.654 0.6479 0.6423 
8 WeAVu 1.71734 1.71195 1.70504 1.6988 1.69072 
Xe 0.127 0.124 0.12 0.117 0.114 
X, 0.2 0.21 0.219 0.228 0.237 
Xu 0.673 0.666 0.661 0.655 0.649 
9 WeAVu 1.94484 1.93944 1.93303 1.92645 1.91796 
Xe 0.112 0.109 0.106 0.103 0.1 
X.- 0.211 0.22 0.228 0.237 0.245 
Xu 0.677 0.671 0.666 0.66 0.655 
10 WeAVu 2.17997 2.17503 2.16904 2.16243 2.15525 
Xe 0.1 0.097 0.094 0.09 0.0878 
X, 0.22 0.228 0.236 0.244 0.252 
Xu 0.68 0.675 0.67 0.666 0.6602 
11 We/Wu 2.42357 2.41894 2.41344 2.40745 2.40039 
In this case, TFP = 6，p =0.2, =5 and e =11 , 
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Table 5c 
Wage Ratio, Proportion of Skilled, Unskilled Labor and Robber 
by p and education cost 
_P 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 一 
Xe 0.1453 0.1407 0.1364 0.132 0.128 
Xr 0.1897 0.222 0.255 0.2877 0.321 
Xu 0.665 0.6373 0.6086 0.5803 0.551 
8 WeAVu 1.71734 1.7353 1.75994 1.79235 1.83527 
Xe 0.127 0.1229 0.119 0.115- 0.112 
X, 0.2 0.2335 0.266 0.298 0.331 
Xu 0.673 0.6436 0.615 0.587 0.557 
9 W./Wu 1.94484 1.96958 2.00327 2.04647 2.10401 
Xe 0.112 0.108 0.1049 0.102 0.099 
Xr 0.211 0.243 0.275 0.307 0.34 
Xu 0.677 0.649 0.6201 0.591 0.561 
10 WeAVu 2.17997 2.21234 2.25567 2.31127 2.38495 
Xe 0.1 0.096 0.0931 0.09 0.087 
Xr 0.22 0.251 0.283 0.315 0.347 
Xu 0.68 0.653 0.6239 0.595 0.566 
n We/Wu 2.42357 2.46399 2.51793 2.58756 2.67718 
In this case, TFP = 6, 7] = 0.2, v = 5 and e =11 
55 
Table 6 
Comparisons of Proportion of Skilled and Unskilled Labor Across Countries with 
the estimated results: Xg, Proportion of Skilled Labor; Xu, Proportion of Unskilled Labor 
Year 
Country 1990 1995 2000 
Hong Kong Xe 11.2 12.2 13.3 
Xu 88.8 87.8 86.7 
Xe/Xu 0.126126126 0.138952164 0.153402537 
Bulgaria Xe 15.0 16.6 19.1 
Xu 85.0 83.4 80.9 
Xe/Xu 0.176470588 0.199040767 0.236093943 
Taiwan Xe 14.2 16.7 19.6 
Xu 85.8 83.3 80.4 
Xe/Xu 0.165501166 0.200480192 0.243781095 
Singapore Xe 4.3 7.3 10.0 
Xu 95.7 92.7 90.0 
Xe/Xu 0.044932079 0.078748652 0.111111111 
South Korea Xe 13.9 22.2 26.3 
Xu 86.1 77.8 73.7 
Xe/Xu 0.161440186 0.285347044 0.356852103 
Our Model Xe/Xu 0.13-0.32 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Education Decision 、 
Educated Uneducated Robber 
/ period 
Borrow money from Employed as Unskilled Wait until the 
unskilled workers Worker Second Period 
Pay for the education Earn Wage .. 
cost Invest in Physical 
Receive education Capital or Become 
Incur Disutility Lender J 
Employed as Skilled Received Principal and Wait for the 、 
Worker Interest Searching Process 
Earn Wage 
Repay the Loan 
、 、 ^ ^ 
Y 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ y period 
Everyone of the Economy Move ( 
f to the Goods Market \ 
Exists ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Consumption 夕 
Figure 1: Actions of Different Kinds of Agent 
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Job Decision 
7\ Uneducated \ 
+ r)e - a / \ Unskilled Labor 
7 \ 
Figure 2: The Flow of Occupational Decision 
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Figure 3a： Equilibrium Proportion for Different Groups when a* - 0 
A 
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Coordinate: 
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Figure 3b： Equilibrium Proportion for Different Groups when a* - ^ < 0 
A 
I J G L 








A: (-8, 0) 
B: (-8,-8+(a* - O ) 
C: (0，-8) 
D： (0，C) 
E： (a*, 0 
F: (a*, 0) 
G: (0，8) , 
H: (8, 0) 
“ I： (-£, £) 
J: (a*, s) 
K： (8, C) 
L: (e, 8) 
M: (E, -8) 
N： (-E, -s) 
61 
Figure 4: Change in Equilibrium Proportion for Different Groups under Wage Subsidy 
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Figure 5: Total Production under Alternative Government Policy 
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